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Abstract
The Mediterranean Sea is the most porous border between Europe 
and its neighbours and the world’s most dangerous border between 
countries that are not at war with each other. Three facts emerge: sea 
routes to Europe are anything but new; places of embarkation and 
disembarkation have changed in relation to controls; and the risk of 
dying at sea has considerably increased over the last decade. Two key 
questions for designing responses must be addressed: to what extent 
do the root causes of clandestine migration across the Mediterra-
nean lie in the Mediterranean region itself; and how many in these 
flows are irregular labour migrants and how many are refugees? The 
Mare Nostrum operation launched by Italy will be discussed in terms 
of: rescues; compliance with European legislation; and possible pull 
effects on unauthorised migration. In conclusion, other possible 
responses will be brought up such as combatting the smugglers and 
pre-voyage intervention.
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Introduction
The second week of September 2014, during which 
around a thousand migrants lost their lives in the 
Mediterranean saw an incident in which smugglers 
deliberately sank a boat with more than 500 persons 
on board.1 The Mediterranean Sea has become in the 
last two decades the most porous border between 
Europe and its neighbours. But it has also become 
the most dangerous border in the world between 
countries that are not at war with each other. We 
estimate, in fact, the risk of dying while crossing this 
border at close to 2%. Crossing the Mediterranean 
is more lethal, indeed, than crossing the Rio Grande 
from Mexico to the USA, the Indian Ocean from 
Indonesia to Australia, or the Gulf of Aden from the 
Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula.2 What is at 
stake is the restoration of European States’ control on 
who enters their territory with it being important to 
ensure that those in need of international protection 
and others fleeing economic distress will no longer 
risk losing their lives while travelling to Europe. The 
challenge is to reconcile the security of the receiving 
state with the security of the migrant person; there is 
also the problem of addressing, in the Mediterranean, 
a problem with roots far beyond the Mediterranean. 
We will here: review the facts; analyse the processes 
leading migrants to travel this route; discuss policy 
1. 10 September 500, people drowned at sea 300 miles from 
the shores of Malta. Three days afterwards in the same 
waters another 300 migrants. The same day fifteen people 
lost their lives in Egyptian waters and, due to two different 
wrecks, 48 migrants drowned in Libyan waters. 14 Sep-
tember, the wreck of a boat loaded with 250 migrants led 
to 224 migrants drowning between Libya and Italy.
2. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2014. Fa-
tal Journeys Tracking Lives Lost during Migration., IOM: 
Geneva. The facts reported this publication clearly show 
that the deaths since 2000 and, in particular in 2014, in 
the Mediterranean considerably outnumber that recorded 
along other border crossings. It should be noted, however, 
that while the number of dead and missing people is un-
derreported for all routes, some itineraries might appear 
more or less lethal than others due to the different level of 
accuracy with which deaths are recorded.
responses on the European shore of the Mediterra-
nean; and review possible improvements. 
1. One million landings
Starting in the 1980s a few trans-Mediterranean itin-
eraries were replaced by many itineraries crossing 
the entire Mediterranean basin. The three following 
facts emerge from data collected from a variety of 
sources.
Fact n°1: the sea route to Europe is anything but new
7 March 1991, Italy suddenly discovered it was a 
much sought-after destination. That day 27,000 
Albanian migrants landed in the harbour of Brindisi, 
carried by merchant ships and many other kinds of 
boats. They were fleeing from the economic distress 
of what was then the People’s Socialist Republic of 
Albania. Shortly after, on 8 August, 20,000 migrants 
coming from Durrës-Albania disembarked in Bari.
In the same year, Spain imposed, for the first time, a 
visa requirement for North African citizens. While 
migration across the Strait of Gibraltar had taken 
place since the 1960s, with thousands of Moroccan 
labour migrants reaching Western Europe via 
southern Spain, not everyone was eligible for the 
new visa. Others made their way clandestinely. In 
a sense, the visa requirement created unauthorized 
entries.3 
The statistics used in the present report start from 
1998 and do not cover the early days of clandestine sea 
journey to southern Europe (Fig.1). From 1 January 
1998 till 30 September 2014, 840,904 migrants were 
recorded by border authorities entering the EU ille-
gally by sea. Until 2013 numbers stood at an annual 
average of 44,000. Noticeable peaks were recorded 
in 2006 and 2011, corresponding respectively to the 
3. Carling, J. 2007. Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities 
at the Spanish-African Borders, International Migration 
Review, 41 no 2:316–343.
3 ■  When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe 
is doing about it.
opening of a new route through Mauritania, and 
later on Senegal, to the Canary Islands and the revo-
lution in Tunisia. In 2014 a spectacular rise in the 
number of arrivals occurred, however. It must be 
attributed to a conjunction of factors: certainly the 
massive rescue operation launched by Italy starting 
from October 2013, but also the mounting waves of 
displaced people in the Middle East and the break-
down of the last barrier between Africa and Europe 
with the collapse of the state in Libya.
Fact n°2: From marked out routes to wanderings on 
the high seas
Migrants’ countries of origin have changed in 
recent years with new conflicts emerging and others 
entering into a process of resolution. Places of disem-
barkation have also changed, in relation to controls 
exerted along the journey and at destination. As a 
general rule, each time a route became more effi-
ciently controlled at embarkation or disembarka-
tion, new routes circumventing controls have been 
invented. In many cases, however, the new routes 
were longer, and, therefore, more dangerous, than 
the older routes.4 
Routes to Italy: From 1991 through 2001, the channel 
of Otranto, the shortest route from Italy to Albania 
(40 miles), was also the most popular. Between 
150,000 and 250,000 third-country nationals took 
4. Fekete, L. 2003. Death at the border – Who is to blame? 
IRR European Race Bulletin, July. Grant, S. 2011. Record-
ing and identifying European frontier deaths, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 13 no 2:135–156. Spijkerbo-
er, T.P. 2007. The human costs of border control, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 9 no 2:127–139.
Fig. 1: Migrants smuggled by sea to the EU 1998-2014 
Sources: Italy: Ministry of Interior and Italin Navy; Spain: Ministry of Interior for 1999-2013 and UNHCR + press for 2014; Malta: 
Frontexwatch for 2008-2013 and UNHCR for 2014; Greece: Hellenic Police, Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection for 2009-
2013 and UNHCR for 2014. For Italy data for 2014 refer to the period 1/1/2014-31/8/2014. For Italy data for 2014 refer to the period 
1/1/2014 – 30/09/2014. For Spain, data for 2013 refer to the period 1/1/2013 - 17/09/2013 and data for 2014 refer to the period 
1/1/2014- 11/8/2014. For Greece data for 2014 refer to the period 1/1/2014 - 31/7/2014. For Malta data for 2014 refer to the period 
1/1/2014 - 22/7/2014.
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this way to Europe (ICMPD, 2000: 84).5 Numbers 
peaked three times: in 1991 (when Albania was 
5. ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy De-
velopment) 2000. How to halt illegal migration to, from, 
and through South East Europe? A report on the activi-
ties of the Working Group on South East Europe of the 
Budapest Group, with proposals on further action in the 
overall framework of the Stability Pact. Prepared by the 
Secretariat of the Budapest Group for the Meeting of the 
Working Group in Skoplje on 27–28 November. 
opened to the world), in 1997 (during the uprising 
known as the Albanian anarchy), and in 1999 (the 
Kosovo crisis). Longer but less travelled routes led 
from Turkey to Italy. Migrants arrived in Puglia. 
Later on, when Italian border guards intensified 
controls, migrants were smuggled to more distant 
Calabria.6 The Sicily Channel was always a route. It 
6. Monzini, P. 2007. Sea-Border Crossings: The Organization 
Fig. 2: Sea routes to Europe 1990s-2014
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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was in the second half of the 2000s, however, that it 
became the most travelled route, with Tunisia and 
Libya as main ports of departure, later on joined by 
Egypt.
Routes to Spain: The journey across the Gibraltar 
strait is short (8 miles) but dangerous due to strong 
currents, due to heavy tanker traffic, and due to the 
small size of the dinghies typically used by migrants. 
The high number of victims in the 1990s compelled 
Morocco and Spain to increase border controls, which 
simply led migrants to find longer ways around. The 
Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) put 
in place by Spain in 1999 on the Strait of Gibraltar 
was later extended to every new route that migrants 
would take, first from Morocco to more distant 
places in Spain, then from Mauritania and Senegal 
to the Canary Islands. In the Canary Islands them-
selves, surveillance was gradually extended from the 
Island of Fuerteventura to Lanzarote (all of them at 
between 75 and 80 miles from the African shore). In 
the first nine months of 2006, between 27,000 and 
31,000 individuals landed on the Canary Islands – 
five times the number in 2005 and triple the record 
in 2002 – and 3,000 drowned along the 1,400 kilo-
metres separating Senegal from the Canary Islands.7 
Spain managed to substantially reduce flows along 
this route by establishing readmission agreements 
with Mauritania and Senegal, and Frontex patrolled 
the Atlantic coast.
Routes to Greece: By contrast with Italy and Spain, 
Greece has a land border, in addition to sea borders, 
with a non-EU country. At a few miles from Turkey, 
the Greek Islands have been popular points of transit 
of Irregular Migration to Italy, Mediterranean Politics, 12 
no2: 163-184.
7. Wihtol de Wenden C. 2009. Human Mobility in the Medi-
terranean Basin: An Integral Element of the Euro-Med-
iterranean Partnership, available on http://www.iemed.
org/anuari/2009/aarticles/a125.pdf [Accessed 15 Septem-
ber 2014]; Carling (2007).
to Europe since the end of the 1980s.8 Unauthorized 
immigration to Greece increased in the early 2000s 
for two reasons. First, border controls carried out 
by Spain and Italy in cooperation with their African 
neighbours diverted part of the migrant flows from 
Africa to Greece. Second, flows from Asia and the 
Middle East considerably increased in this period.9 
Annual numbers of people intercepted by the Greek 
Coast Guard had stood at 3,000 since 2002. In 2007, 
this number peaked at 8,018.10 Since 2009, as a conse-
quence of the intensified patrols on the Greek coast 
Guard, unauthorized immigration flows shifted from 
sea to land borders.11 The trend changed again, at the 
end of 2012, when Greece built a fence on its border 
with Turkey. The remarkable drop (95%) in undocu-
mented immigrants entering Greece through the 
Evros River was offset by a new increase in the flows 
crossing the Aegean Sea.12 
Fact n°3: Sea routes to Europe are increasingly lethal 
Vast numbers have lost their lives at sea: 15,016 dead 
and missing persons were counted from January 
1998 till 30 September 2014 (Fig. 3)13 and there will 
be many invisible deaths that will remain uncounted. 
8. Kasimis, C. 2008. Greece: Illegal Immigration in the 
Midst of Crisis, MPI. Available on: http://www.migra-
tionpolicy.org/article/greece-illegal-immigration-midst-
crisis [Accessed on 10 September 2014]
9. Kasimis (2012).
10. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR) (2007) UNHCR Briefing Notes [online], United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 5 
October 2007, available on: http://www.unhcr.org/news/
NEWS/47060794d.html [Accessed 20 September 2014].
11. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2008. 
Migration in Greece: A Country Profile 2008. Geneva.
12. Ekathimerini.com, Monday December 17, 2012 (12:32). 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_ws-
ite1_1_17/12/2012_474782
13. This number has been calculated drawing on the media 
reports collected by the Italian NGO Fortress Europe 
(http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/).
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Moreover, the risk of dying at sea14 has increased 
from an average of 0.4% between 1998 and 2002 to 
an average of 2.1% since 2003 (Fig. 4). 
Two peaks, both in terms of absolute numbers 
and risk, occurred in 2006-08 and in 2011. The 
first one was a consequence of the route to Spain 
shifting from the Mediterranean (across the Strait 
of Gibraltar) to the Atlantic (from Mauritania and 
Senegal to the Canary Islands). The second peak 
was almost entirely due to an upsurge in migration 
to Italy (62,692 unauthorized migrants) in the first 
months of uprising in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Not 
only did the numbers embarking increase, but the 
risk of dying rose in conjunction with high levels of 
insecurity at departure. Four wrecks meant enor-
mous death tolls: on 4 April 2011, 213 persons died 
when their boat capsized during a rescue operation 
off Lampedusa; 13 April, 495 persons were reported 
missing 20 days after their boats left the Libyan 
shore; 28 April, 330 persons lost their lives on the 
14. The risk of dying at sea is defined as [dead and missing / 
(dead and missing + arrivals)]. It must be noted that both 
numbers of dead and missing persons and numbers of 
arrivals are under-recorded. This may result in a biased 
estimate of the risk of dying if one series is more under-
recorded than the other.
same route; on 2 June 272 persons went missing after 
a boat was rescued off the shore of Tunisia.
At the time of writing (October 2014) the present 
calendar year has already produced a record number 
of deaths in conjunction with a record number of 
migrants, but a below-average risk of dying.15 Many 
more people have been smuggled at sea (135,602, 
out of which 118,175 to Italy alone) and many more 
have been rescued.
2. Seeking life or livelihood?
Key questions for designing adequate policy 
responses are: to what extent do the root causes of 
clandestine migration across the Mediterranean lie 
in the Mediterranean region itself; and how many in 
these flows are irregular labour migrants and how 
many are refugees? 
15. According to the data contained in the media reports col-
lected by the Italian NGO Fortress Europe, 2,247 people 
died from 1 January to 30 September 2014. The number 
of dead and missing people, however, is reported as con-
siderably higher (3072 persons) in a recent publication by 
IOM (2014), which draws on various sources including 
media reports, information gathered by IOM Field Of-
fices, data from medical examiner offices and UNHCR. 
Fig. 3: Dead and missing persons on irregular maritime routes to the EU 1988-2014
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data retrieved from Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/)
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Question 1: Is the Mediterranean an origin or transit 
zone?
According to the data produced by the Italian 
Ministry of Interior, 494,555 migrants were smug-
gled to Italian shores between 1 January 1999 and 
31 August 2014. Less than half of them (232,787 
persons) citizens of a Mediterranean country, with 
Tunisia, Syria, Former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Pales-
tine, Egypt and Albania being the most represented 
in that category (Fig. 5a). A closer look at the data 
reveals that two countries of origin, Morocco and 
Egypt, have provided relatively constant, but limited, 
cross-Mediterranean flows, while flows from the 
other Mediterranean countries were negligible 
through the same period. Peaks naturally occur in 
conjunction with specific political events: the wars 
of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia; in Tunisia the 
brutal repression of social movements in 2008; then 
the uprisings in 2011;16 and in Syria the civil war 
triggering massive refugee flows starting from 2012. 
Arrivals of Palestinians, though in smaller numbers, 
often correspond to particular events such as Israeli 
bombing in the summer of 2014 that resulted Pales-
tinians fleeing the Gaza Strip through Egypt.17
Most migrants (261,768 people) who have landed 
in Italy in the past 15 years were not citizens of any 
Mediterranean country (Fig. 5b). The southern or 
eastern shore of the Mediterranean was for them the 
last leg of a longer journey that began in the Horn 
of Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan), 
other Sub-Saharan African countries (in particular 
16. Boubakri, H., Révolution et migration internationales en 
Tunisie, MPC Research Report No. 2013/04. 
17. Please note that, since data provided by the Italian Minis-
try of Interior cover up to 31 August 2014, arrivals of Pal-
estinians occurred during the month of September 2014 
are not included in Figure 5a.
Fig. 4: Probability of dying at sea on maritime routes to EU, 1998-2014 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data retrieved from Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/); Italian Ministry of Inte-
rior and navy; Spanish Ministry of Interior; Hellenic Police, Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection; Frontexwatch, UNHCR.
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Nigeria, Mali, Ghana and Gambia), the Middle East 
(Iraq), and even further East (Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, India…).
Question 2: how many in these flows are irregular 
labour migrants and how many are refugees?
Those smuggled by sea to Europe typically comprise 
what UNHCR calls mixed migration flows: i.e. 
refugees and economic migrants using the same 
routes and resorting to the same smugglers to reach 
the same destination.18 How many of the 49,000 
migrants who on average have entered Europe by 
sea every year illegally since 1998, are persons in 
18. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR) (2007) UNHCR Refugee Protection and Mixed 
Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action [online], United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 2007, 
available on: http://www.unhcr.org/4742a30b4.html [Ac-
cessed 20 September 2014].
Fig. 5: Arrivals at sea in Italy from 1999 till 2014, by declared nationality
5a: Top seven Mediterranean nationalities
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
30	  
1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
(un/l	  
31/8)	  
Th
ou
sa
nd
s	  
Tunisia	  
Syria	  
Former	  Jugoslavia	  
Morocco	  
Pales/ne	  
Egypt	  
Albania	  
5b: Top seven non-Mediterranean nationalities
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
30	  
1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
(un/l	  
31/8)	  
Th
ou
sa
nd
s	  
Eritrea	  
Nigeria	  
Somalia	  
Iraq	  	  
Mali	  
Pakistan	  
Afghanistan	  
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior
9 ■  When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe 
is doing about it.
Fig. 6: Migrants smuggled by sea to Italy and asylum seekers in Italy, 2008-2013
6a: Top 20 nationalities of clandestine migrants smuggled to sea to Italy
6b: Top 20 nationalities of asylum seekers in Italy
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior and Eurostat
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need of international protection and how many are 
economic migrants simply in search of a better life? 
Answering this question would require information 
about the causes of migration, but such information 
is lacking. Statistics on migrants smuggled at sea to 
the EU are extremely limited and stop, of course, after 
the migrants have landed. What has been their fate 
in Europe? Have they put in claims for asylum in the 
first Member state they reach, in another Member 
state, or nowhere? We simply do not know… 
An indirect way to address the question of whether 
refugees or clandestine labour migrants are predom-
inant in trans-Mediterranean ‘mixed’ flows is to 
compare the distribution by nationality of migrants 
smuggled by sea with asylum seekers and regular 
migrants. Similarities (or differences) in the distri-
butions by nationality will be interpreted as a sign of 
similarity (or difference) in the kind of flow (asylum 
vs. economic). Moreover, because Italy is regarded 
as an entry point to the whole EU, nationalities of 
migrants smuggled to Italy must be compared with 
nationalities of regular migrants and asylum seekers, 
not only to Italy but also to the rest of the EU.
There is a fairly striking similarity between the 
nationalities of migrants smuggled at sea and those 
of asylum seekers. Indeed: 1) only 3 countries – 
Algeria, Morocco, Palestine –are in the top 20 coun-
tries of nationalities of migrants smuggled at sea but 
not among the top 20 countries of origin of asylum 
seekers who lodged their applications in the same 
period (Fig. 6a); and 2) only two countries –Iraq and 
Turkey– are among the top 20 countries of origin of 
asylum seekers but not among the main countries of 
origin of smuggled migrants. 
For Tunisia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria and 
Egypt clandestine migrants considerably outnumber 
asylum seekers in Italy. This might be explained in 
two ways: i) smuggled migrants are asylum seekers 
but they do not lodge their asylum claim in Italy, 
which they use only as an entry point; ii) smuggled 
migrants from these countries are mainly economic 
Fig.7: Top 20 nationalities of asylum seekers in EU-28, 2008-2013
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior and Eurostat
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migrants. These two possible situations are discussed 
in what follows. 
First, are migrants smuggled to Italy likely to be 
asylum seekers lodging their claims in other EU 
Member States? Figure 7 demonstrates that Somalia, 
Syria, Eritrea and Nigeria are among the main coun-
tries of origin of persons looking for international 
protection in the EU, as well as among migrants 
smuggled to Italy, suggesting that Italy is an entry 
point for refugees who later on go to other member 
states. By contrast, Egypt and Tunisia are not major 
countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU. This 
suggests that Egyptians and Tunisians who do not 
apply for asylum in Italy are economic migrants who 
either stay in Italy or who go elsewhere. 
Second, does Italy play a role as an entry point 
for unauthorised economic migrants, or do these 
economic migrants intend to stay in Italy? Italy seems 
to be the final destination for smuggled migrants 
originating in Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria 
as these two countries are in the top twenty nation-
alities of both regular migrants and migrants smug-
gled by sea (Fig. 8a). None of the other nationali-
ties of regular migrants is significantly represented 
among smuggled migrants, a fact that suggests that 
smuggling does not bring migrant workers to Italy 
unless they remain clandestine. If sea smuggling 
does not bring large numbers of economic migrants 
to Italy, does it bring them to the rest of Europe? Fig. 
8b points again to Tunisia and Nigeria as the nation-
alities among the top twenty in the two distributions. 
In sum, only smuggled migrants from Tunisia and 
in smaller numbers from Algeria and Morocco seem 
to be largely migrant workers. Flows from Nigeria, 
Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan appear to be the most 
mixed. Flows from Eritrea, Syria, Somalia, Afghani-
stan, Mali, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Palestine 
are largely refugees, with persons fleeing from life-
threatening situations in search of protection in Italy 
or, more often, in other EU member states. 
They undertake a long and dangerous journey across 
countries that are as insecure as the ones they leave, at 
the mercy of ruthless smugglers. They do so because 
the documents which are required at destination are 
either not available in their countries of origin, or in 
the countries they cross. The last step of this journey 
is the southern shore of the Mediterranean. North 
African countries have long been points of depar-
ture to Europe, both for their own citizens and for 
persons in transit. In recent years Libya has become a 
major place for boats embarking to Europe. With its 
huge oil wealth and low population, Libya has been, 
in fact, a major migrant-receiving country over the 
last half century. The Libyan route has also always 
been travelled by migrant workers and refugees 
trying to reach Europe. When clandestine migration 
through the Mediterranean picked up momentum 
at the end of 1990s, containing irregular migrants 
on the Libyan shore became a bargaining chip for 
the Libyan government — then under international 
embargo — in its negotiation with Europe. Even after 
the embargo was lifted, Colonel Kaddafi continued 
to use the threat of migration as a scarecrow in his 
diplomacy with Southern European states (Fargues 
2009).19 Unsurprisingly when the Kaddafi regime 
was ousted in 2011 with political chaos ensuing, 
police controls disappeared from most of the Libyan 
shore, leaving the way clear for migrant smugglers. 
3. From push back to rescue: Mare 
Nostrum
Launched by the Letta government in response to 
the major ship wreck a few miles off Lampedusa in 
October 2013, the Mare Nostrum operation was to 
19. Fargues, P. 2009. Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging 
Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the 
Mediterranean, International Migration Review, 43 no. 
3:544–577.
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deal with “the humanitarian emergency ongoing in 
the Sicily channel, due to the exceptional inflows of 
migrants.”20 A year after it began, it is time to eval-
20. Ministero della Difesa. Avaialble on: http://www.marina.
difesa.it/attivita/operativa/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx 
[Accessed 25 September 2014]
uate this operation which has been at the centre of a 
harsh debate both in Italy and the EU more gener-
ally. For this purpose three issues must be addressed.
First, has Mare Nostrum achieved its main aim, 
i.e. reducing the risk of mortality at sea? Figure 10 
Fig. 8 Regular Migrants in Italy and in EU-28 and arrivals by sea to Italy, 2008-2013
8a: Top 20 nationalities of regular migrants in Italy
8b: Top 20 nationalities of regular migrants in EU-28
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior and Eurostat
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shows that such risks dropped dramatically after the 
launch of Mare Nostrum and remained low during 
the winter and the early spring of 2014. In May, July 
and August the risk rose but continued to be well 
below the level reached in October 2013 and during 
most of 2011, another year of numerous arrivals. 
However, mortality abruptly rose in September 2014, 
when it reached a climax never attained 2011-14. Fig. 
9, therefore, suggests that, though Mare Nostrum 
has rescued an impressive number of people (over 
100,000 since its launch), it has not reduced the 
risk taken by individual to die at sea. One can argue 
that perhaps it is a question of numbers. So many 
migrants have been smuggled in 2014 that ensuring 
a proper surveillance of the Sicily strait has become 
challenging. Moreover, it might be that, searching 
the sea more systematically, Mare Nostrum found 
wrecked boats and drowned persons that otherwise 
would not been have collected.
Second, did Italy manage to reconcile its effort to 
save human lives with the obligations deriving from 
the Dublin III regulation, i.e. the duty of registering 
asylum seekers among those smuggled to Italy and 
seeking international protection?21 Some investiga-
21. “Where it is established, […], that an applicant has ir-
regularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, 
sea or air having come from a third country, the Member 
tive reports22 have shown that Italian civil servants 
used to facilitate migrants’ attempts to cross Italy 
from south to north, without leaving administra-
tive traces, so they can lodge their applications in 
other European countries,where migrants think 
they will receive better treatment.23 This was done, 
State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the 
application for international protection. That responsibil-
ity shall cease 12 months after the date on which the ir-
regular border crossing took place.” Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 of 26 June 2013, Article 13.
22. Trincia, P. 2014. “L’Odissea dei Migranti”, Anno Zero LA7, 
15 May, http://www.serviziopubblico.it/2014/05/lodissea-
dei-migranti/
 Valesini, G. 2014. “Immigrazione”, Ballaró RAITV, 6 May, 
http://www.rai.tv/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/Con-
tentItem-e952d6c7-57c7-4e26-a065-f97e3f3fc3a3.html#p= 
23. In the wake of complaints by other European countries, 
the Italian Ministry of Interior issued a circular in mid-
September that made more stringent the modalities and 
timing of registration for migrants arriving irregularly. 
The new provisions, however, seems to have resulted in 
an increased use of violence against migrants who re-
fuse to give their fingerprints. Labrushi, L. 2014. “Im-
migrazione, senza un piano si rischia il caos”, Avvenire.
it, 29 Sept., http://www.avvenire.it/Cronaca/Pagine/im-
migrazione-senza-un-piano-si-rischia-il-caos.aspx?utm_
content=buffer84bda&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer; Pasta, S. 
2014. “Foto e impronte: adesso i profughi vengono sche-
dati”, Corriere.it, 29 Sept., http://lacittanuova.milano.cor-
riere.it/2014/09/29/foto-e-impronte-adesso-i-profughi-
vengono-schedati/.
Fig. 9: Probability of dying at sea on irregular maritime routes to Sicily by month, 2011 - September 2014
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Fortress Europe and the Italian Ministry of Interior.
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for instance, by communicating to migrants the date 
when they are due to be registered, thus giving them 
time to leave the reception centres where they are 
accommodated before the registration takes place. 
This would particularly apply to Syrians whose 
community is better established in western and 
northern Europe, notably in Sweden.24 Figure 10, 
24. In Sweden, since September 2013 all Syrians who have 
which compares the numbers of migrants smuggled 
by sea to Italy with numbers of new asylum seekers, 
both in Italy and in the whole EU-28 for the period 
October 2013-July 2014, seems to confirm similar 
dynamics for Eritreans, Syrians, Palestinians, and 
Somalis. Indeed, these countries see many of their 
nationals smuggled by sea to Italy, as well as asylum 
claimed asylum have been granted refugee status.
Fig. 10: Top ten nationalities of migrants smuggled at sea to Italy, October 2013 - July 2014
Sources: Italian Ministry of Interior and EUROSTAT
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seekers in the whole EU-28, with only few lodging 
an asylum application in Italy.25 Italy is a gateway not 
a destination. 
By not registering migrants as asylum seekers as 
soon as they are rescued and by not discouraging 
them from reaching other EU countries, Italy has 
breached the Dublin III Regulation. On the other 
hand, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the 
burden of both rescuing migrants at sea and giving 
them asylum must be born uniquely by one country.26 
Answering this question is becoming increasingly 
urgent as Mare Nostrum will be winded up at the end 
of October 2014 and replaced by Frontex Plus.27 This 
operation, also called Joint Operation Triton, is due 
to be carried out by Frontex, the European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union. Triton will merge and expand 
Hermes and Aeneas, two Frontex surveillance and 
“early detection” operations already in force in Italy, 
drawing on the resources that EU member states will 
make available on a voluntary basis. So far, Spain, 
France, Finland, Portugal, Iceland, the Netherlands, 
25. A similar situation was observed in Greece in 2013, see Tri-
andafyllidou, A. and Dimitriadi A. 2014. Governing Irregu-
lar Migration and Asylum at the Borders of Europe: Between 
Efficiency and Protection, Imagining Europe No. 6, IAI.
26. It should be noted, however, that “Southern countries are 
exposed to pressures at their borders because of their geo-
graphical proximity to zones of instability and conflict. 
Northern European countries have traditionally been the 
preferred destinations of asylum seekers from all over the 
world. Thus, […] Northern European countries are more 
“protected” from irregular migration because of their geo-
graphical position and hence face mostly the problem of 
processing applications rather than that of filtering them 
at their borders. Triandafyllidou, A., Disentangling the 
Migration and Asylum Knot. Dealing with Crisis Situa-
tions and Avoiding Detention, EUI RSCAS Policy Papers, 
No. 2013/19, p.9.
27. Ministero dell’interno 2014, “Strategie per l’immigrazione, 
Alfano riferisce alla Camera”, 16 October, http://www.
interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/
sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/2014_10_16_inform-
ativa_Alfano_Camera_strategie_flussi.html
Lithuania and Malta have declared their willing-
ness to participate.28 Each country will make avail-
able its equipment for a month, in order to share the 
expenses (Frontex has foreseen a monthly budget 
of 2,9 millions of euros).29 However, the modality 
of their participation still needs to be negotiated. In 
particular, it is not clear whether the countries whose 
vessels will rescue smuggled migrants will disem-
bark the latter on their territory or on the closest 
shore and, therefore, it is known which country will 
take responsibility for any asylum claims.
The third question to be asked is whether Mare 
Nostrum has attracted migrants who otherwise would 
not have crossed the Mediterranean or whether it is 
the regional context in which it takes place that has 
inflated the number of migrants. Right-wing politi-
cians in Italy and in the EU blame Mare Nostrum for 
facilitating the smuggling business, while humani-
tarian associations tend to attribute the rise to 
migrants smuggled at sea to the worsening polit-
ical situation in their countries of departure and to 
anarchy in Libya. Unfortunately there is no solid 
data to help us answer this question. 
Conclusion
Resolving the tragedy of migrants smuggled at sea 
has become a high priority. But how?
Response 1: Combatting the smugglers
Smugglers are responsible for uncountable deaths at 
sea and, for this reason among many others, elimi-
28. These countries will make available some technical equip-
ment and specialized staff while Romania, Switzerland, 
Norway, Germany, Sweden, Austria and Poland will pro-
vide only specialized staff.
29. Le Soir 2014. “Immigration: huit pays dont la France 
s’engagent dans Triton (Frontex)”, 14 October, http://
www.lesoir.be/680242/article/actualite/fil-info/fil-info-
monde/2014-10-14/immigration-huit-pays-dont-france-
s-engagent-dans-triton-frontex
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nating the smuggling business is a pressing duty. 
One should make no mistake, however: smugglers 
are not the root cause of the problem. They are the 
wrong response to people who are desperate for 
international protection. Smugglers did proliferate 
in response to a demand and it is the demand that 
must be tackled. 
Moreover, eradicating sea smuggling should not 
mean that refugees are maintained in the last step 
of their journey, which is Libya for most. It requires 
cooperating with the local authorities and ensuring 
that the country is a safe country of asylum. This is 
not the case with Libya, where the state has collapsed 
leaving the country on the verge of civil war. 
Response 2: Intervening at an earlier step of the journey
People fleeing Syria are now seeking shelter in all 
parts of the Arab world and in Turkey, a vast region, 
which at the time of writing is host to over three 
million Syrian refugees. As far away from Damascus 
as Nouakchott in Mauritania, it has become common 
to see Syrian refuges forced to beg in the streets. 
They have travelled 5,500 kilometres across seven 
countries and an endless desert to find themselves 
scraping a livelihood in one of the poorest countries 
on earth. People fleeing Eritrea and other war-torn 
parts of the horn of Africa reach the Mediterranean 
after crossing several countries as insecure as their 
own. There is no safe haven on their road. 
The vast majority of migrants smuggled at sea need 
international protection. The only way to put an end 
to their hazardous exodus, while respecting Europe’s 
commitment to protecting lives, requires that we 
operate at a much earlier step of their journey, 
possibly in the first country of asylum they reach 
after escaping their own. Two kinds of action must 
be contemplated. First, there must be embassies of 
EU member states to provide people in need of inter-
national protection with an opportunity to apply for 
a visa of whatever kind (humanitarian or not). In 
order to avoid only a few Member States becoming 
overwhelmed with refugees, a mechanism for redis-
tributing the persons admitted across the entire EU 
should also be put in place. A second response might 
see safe havens secured close to the conflict zone. 
